Nineteenth-Century Women\u27s Rights Advocates on Abortion by Gordon, Linda
Seattle University School of Law 
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Seattle University Law Review SUpra Student Publications and Programs 
2013 
Nineteenth-Century Women's Rights Advocates on Abortion 
Linda Gordon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr_supra 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Linda Gordon, Nineteenth-Century Women's Rights Advocates on Abortion: Comment on Tracy Thomas's 
Misappropriating Women's History in the Law and Politics of Abortion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 27 
(2013). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle University Law Review 
SUpra by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. 
	  	   27 
Nineteenth-Century Women’s Rights Advocates on 
Abortion: Comment on Tracy Thomas’s 
Misappropriating Women’s History in the 
 Law and Politics of Abortion 
Linda Gordon* 
I am delighted that Tracy Thomas took on the task of responding to 
Feminists for Life’s allegedly historical case against abortion1 and de-
lighted with the article she produced. My pleasure is personal because, as 
Professor Thomas knows, I am the historian whose work first brought to 
light the reproduction-control thinking of nineteenth-century women’s 
rights advocates, which underlies the antiabortionists’ historical misrep-
resentations.2 Although I have nothing but praise for Thomas’s superb 
article, I am taking advantage of this invitation to respond by adding a 
few thoughts. 
I want to emphasize a point that Thomas made: The crucial factor 
in the nineteenth-century feminists’3 view of reproduction control was 
their concern about female sexual vulnerability.4 In home and on the 
streets, in marriage and out of it, in domestic and commercial workplac-
es, everywhere they saw that women had very few defenses against rape 
and harassment.5 What’s more, they understood that women’s economic 
dependence on men underlay their sexual defenselessness.6 Within mar-
riage, even well-to-do women were typically unable to leave even the 
most abusive husbands because, if they did so, they were likely to lose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Florence Kelley Professor of History, New York University. 
 1. See Tracy A. Thomas, Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and Politics of Abor-
tion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 2. LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH 
CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976). In 2002 this book was revised so extensively that it was given a new 
title: The Moral Property of Women. 
 3. It is important to note that these nineteenth-century radicals did not call themselves femi-
nists. That word did not yet exist. I apply the label, as do other scholars, in order to underscore their 
continuity with contemporary feminists. 
 4. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 27–30. 
 5. See id. at 42–53 (discussing Stanton’s defense of Hester Vaughn). 
 6. Id. at 61. 
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custody of their children, a fate which very few women would risk.7 
Poorer wives found it virtually impossible to raise children without hus-
bands because of their limited employment options. As late as the year 
1900, the majority of children in orphan asylums were not without living 
parents; they were children of single mothers who could not find a way 
to simultaneously support and care for their children and were thereby 
forced to place their children in orphanages. (Most hoped to reclaim their 
children at some point, but many were never able to do so.)8 Employed 
women often could not risk refusing the demands of supervisors, whether 
they were factory foremen or the men in the families in which the wom-
en were servants. 
Women’s economic dependence was also at the heart of the femi-
nist attitude toward seduction law.9 Because marriage was economically 
essential to women, they saw that a promise of marriage could reasona-
bly lead a woman into sexual surrender to a treacherous man, thus mak-
ing seduction a prima facie form of abuse. 
It’s true that nineteenth-century women’s rights advocates shared 
some of the Victorian prudery of their age. Certainly they believed that 
women should remain virgins before marriage. But more importantly, 
they saw the risk of pregnancy as a defensive weapon for women.10 
Without that risk, what could stop men from abuse? (It is worth noting 
that at least until the mid-twentieth century this logic was commonly 
used by women against men’s sexual pressure.) Their opposition to easy 
forms of reproduction control—including both what we call contracep-
tion and abortion—reflected that notion of pregnancy risk as a deterrent 
to male sexual exploitation. For preventing conception, they preferred to 
hammer away at men’s sense of sexual entitlement. Hence they advocat-
ed “voluntary motherhood,” as Thomas makes clear.11 To women today, 
the nineteenth-century feminist prescription for prevention of concep-
tion—abstinence except when conception is desired—seems impractica-
ble. It makes sense only when one remembers that their priority was 
women’s right to say no to men. 
Still, in their emphasis on this right, some of the more radical wom-
en’s rights advocates—notably Elizabeth Cady Stanton—were also mak-
ing a distinctly anti-Victorian move: they understood, I believe, that it 
would be forever impossible for women to say yes to sex unless they had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7. See id. at 5. 
 8. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
WELFARE (1994). 
 9. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 43–44 (discussing seduction law in the context of Stanton’s 
defense of Hester Vaughn). 
 10. Id. at 28 n.192. 
 11. Id. at 27–30. 
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the actual right to say no. Without the ability to say no, there is no such 
thing as acquiescence. 
But after conception occurred, the story changed. Most nineteenth-
century feminists were intensely pro-motherhood and used the im-
portance of good mothering as a prime reason that women needed civil 
and political rights. Nevertheless, many of them clung to the traditional 
tolerance of abortion before quickening—a tolerance practiced across the 
world in all religions, to the best of my knowledge—as a reasonable, le-
gitimate action when having a child, or another child, created significant 
problems. As numerous historians have shown, abortions routinely ap-
pear in women’s diaries as regrettable but necessary and legitimate solu-
tions to such problems. 
The nineteenth-century feminists, true to their primary concern for 
women, focused on situations in which women needed abortions because 
of male sexual exploitation, and they continued to regard abortion as an 
often-regrettable necessity. Unlike Thomas, I don’t see this attitude as 
having to do with a right to privacy.12 Most women of the mid-nineteenth 
century did not have a developed or articulated sense of a right to priva-
cy. For example, few women ever had beds, let alone bedrooms, of their 
own, but more often shared beds with siblings, then husbands, then ba-
bies. Strong familial bonds, across generations, meant that interventions 
by others in their immediate community did not appear as interference 
into a private matter. Moreover the emphasis on marital privacy, as for-
mulated in the Goldberg decision, would not have reverberated with 
many women of the Victorian era who did not typically expect their hus-
bands to be their closest friends or confidants. 
Rather, I think the nineteenth-century feminist belief in voluntary 
motherhood was influenced by the women’s rights movement’s origins 
in the fight against slavery. The first three generations of feminists were 
all abolitionists, and they campaigned against slavery particularly by in-
voking narratives about the cruel treatment and sexual abuse of slave 
women. Later they began analogizing white women’s to enslaved wom-
en’s lack of rights. So the right to voluntary motherhood was to them a 
right to live as a freewoman, not as a slave. Freedom of the individual 
was, for example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s most absolute ethical princi-
ple. It is worth noting that when contemporary antiabortionists refer to 
female narcissism or selfishness, they are repeating exactly the ideas of 
their counterparts of 150 years ago: that women have no right to this kind 
of freedom because their duty is always and eternally motherhood and 
that to defy that duty is self-indulgent and self-centered; the duty of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 12. Id. at 30. 
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women is, in other words, to sacrifice themselves always to motherhood. 
So when Stanton and some of her cohort argued that mercy should be 
extended to the mother who committed infanticide on an unwanted ba-
by,13 this argument was a logical extension of Stanton’s absolutist de-
fense of freedom from male coercion. She never encouraged infanticide 
or abortion, any more than contemporary feminists do; like feminists to-
day, she encouraged prevention. But when prevention failed, then a 
woman had a right to defend herself, she believed.  I would like to think 
that even today, most of us would agree that even infanticide usually re-
flects a woman’s (or girl’s) desperation, and that mercy and help, not 
prosecution, is the better response. 
As to the dubious quotation from Stanton that children should not 
be treated as property,14 she might well have said this. But Thomas is 
absolutely correct that she would not have been referring to abortion but 
rather to custody disputes.15 All the women’s rights advocates of the time 
were fighting the tradition of male authority over and ownership of chil-
dren, and to make this case, they initiated the now familiar argument that 
the best interests of the child should overrule automatic male custody. In 
other words, they did not argue to substitute female for male ownership; 
rather, they argued to discard entirely the tradition that parents “owned” 
their children. 
Another way in which the nineteenth-century antiabortion cam-
paign resembles that of today is its impact on women’s emotions. Before 
the first campaign, for millennia, women’s typical response to successful 
abortions was not guilt but relief; it was the massive medical and reli-
gious anti-abortion discourse that created guilt. The second campaign did 
likewise. In the twentieth-century right through the 1960s, there is no 
evidence that women typically felt guilty for having abortions; after the 
massive antiabortion campaign that the women’s movement provoked, 
even pro-choice women began to experience sadness and guilt after abor-
tions. I do not challenge the realness of these emotions, but I do believe 
that they have been socially constructed by the “abortion-is-murder” dis-
course. 
I’ve never had the occasion to discuss these issues at length with 
Feminists for Life, but it is something I would like to do. Given that ab-
sence, I would hypothesize two things about their point of view: either 
they are not really feminists, failing to trust women to make decisions 
responsibly, or they haven’t examined the actual conditions for women 
in the nineteenth century. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 13. Id. at 44. 
 14. Id. at 36. 
 15. Id. at 36–37. 
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I would like to underscore another misuse of history. Although it is 
outside the scope of Thomas’s article, it is also a matter personal to me: 
the claim by some antiabortion campaigners that abortion—and, often, 
all birth control—is racist. Readers may have seen the billboards in black 
and Latina/o neighborhoods picturing babies or toddlers with the texts, 
“The most dangerous place for an African American baby is in the 
womb” and “El lugar mas peligroso para un latino [sic] es el vientre de 
su madre.” This charge also uses my book on the history of birth-control 
politics as the source, because I was the historian who exposed the coop-
eration between the birth-control and eugenics movements in the early 
twentieth century. But in the hands of antiabortion/anti-birth control ad-
vocates, this claim too is a nasty misrepresentation. Like most white 
Americans, some birth-control campaigners had racist attitudes; most 
birth-control campaigners, however, were less racist than average whites; 
and most birth-control campaigners aligned themselves with the progres-
sive Left in American politics.16 Coercive sterilization, a method never 
endorsed by the birth controllers, was in fact used by racist elites against 
poor people of color, until the revived feminist movement of the 1970s 
campaigned against it. Most important, most civil rights leaders of all 
racial and ethnic groups supported women’s access to birth control—
access to voluntary motherhood. They still do. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 16. The modern birth-control campaign was begun by Emma Goldman and her anarchist com-
rades along with Margaret Sanger and her socialist comrades. The Left at this time was by no means 
free of racism but it was free-er than mainstream America. Birth control was supported by early 
civil-rights advocates, such as W. E. B. Du Bois. See ROBERT G. WEISBORD, GENOCIDE? BIRTH 
CONTROL AND THE BLACK AMERICAN, ch. 4 (Greenwood Press 1975); GORDON, supra note 2. 
